Collected research

Timeless Timing Attacks: Exploiting Concurrency to Leak Secrets over Remote Connections

Tom Van Goethem, Christina Pöpper, Wouter Joosen and Mathy Vanhoef · usenix.org

Concurrency-based timing attacks compare the order in which two simultaneous requests return rather than their absolute times, so network jitter cancels out. Sent as multiplexed HTTP/2 requests inside one packet, or over Tor, they resolve remote execution differences of about 100 nanoseconds, and are demonstrated against web servers, onion services and EAP-pwd.

Record

Researcher

Tom Van Goethem, Christina Pöpper, Wouter Joosen and Mathy Vanhoef

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Other

In the archive

• Collected in the 2020 research round

Related sources

• USENIX Security '20 - Timeless Timing Attacks: Exploiting Concurrency to Leak Secrets over Remote

Tags

• timing-attack
• side-channel
• http2
• info-leak
• measurement-study

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Tom Van Goethem, Christina Pöpper, Wouter Joosen and Mathy Vanhoef, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.