Collected research

Targeted Deanonymization via the Cache Side Channel

Targeted Deanonymization via the Cache Side Channel: Attacks and Defenses

Mojtaba Zaheri, Yossi Oren and Reza Curtmola · usenix.org

Targeted deanonymization that tells a malicious page whether its visitor holds a given public identifier such as an email address or a Twitter handle. It reads the CPU cache side channel rather than a cross-site leak, so cross-origin resource and opener policies and SameSite cookies do not stop it; it also works against Tor Browser.

Record

Document

Targeted Deanonymization via the Cache Side Channel: Attacks and Defenses

Researcher

Mojtaba Zaheri, Yossi Oren and Reza Curtmola

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Other

In the archive

• Collected in the 2022 research round

Related sources

• USENIX Security '22 - Targeted Deanonymization via the Cache Side Channel: Attacks and Defenses

Tags

• side-channel
• xsleak
• info-leak
• sop-bypass
• cookie
• browser-extension
• defence
• owasp-a01-2021
• owasp-a07-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Mojtaba Zaheri, Yossi Oren and Reza Curtmola, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.