Collected research

SnailLoad: Exploiting Remote Network Latency Measurements without JavaScript

Stefan Gast, Roland Czerny, Jonas Juffinger, Fabian Rauscher, Simone Franza and Daniel Gruss · usenix.org

Presents SnailLoad, a remote side channel in which a victim merely downloading an asset from an attacker-controlled server leaks activity on their machine through variations in network latency, requiring no JavaScript, code execution or user interaction. The paper demonstrates video fingerprinting at F1 scores up to 98% and open-world website fingerprinting at 62.8%, lifting attacks that previously required a person-in-the-middle position into a purely remote setting.

Record

Researcher

Stefan Gast, Roland Czerny, Jonas Juffinger, Fabian Rauscher, Simone Franza and Daniel Gruss

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Server

In the archive

• Collected in the 2024 research round

Related sources

• USENIX Security '24 - SnailLoad: Exploiting Remote Network Latency Measurements without JavaScript

Tags

• side-channel
• timing-attack
• info-leak
• deanonymization

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Stefan Gast, Roland Czerny, Jonas Juffinger, Fabian Rauscher, Simone Franza and Daniel Gruss, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.