Collected research

Loophole: Timing Attacks on Shared Event Loops in Chrome

Pepe Vila and Boris Köpf · usenix.org

Chrome shares event loops between mutually distrusting pages, so a spy page can enqueue its own events and time how long they wait to infer what another process is doing. The resulting side channel identifies the page a victim is viewing and leaks user interactions such as typing and mouse activity.

Record

Researcher

Pepe Vila and Boris Köpf

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Browser

In the archive

• Collected in the 2016–17 research round

Tags

• side-channel
• timing-attack
• xsleak
• javascript
• info-leak

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Pepe Vila and Boris Köpf, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.