Collected research
Isolated and Exhausted: Attacking Operating Systems via Site Isolation in the Browser
Shows that site isolation, by giving web content its own operating system processes, hands a mere web attacker OS-level resources to exhaust: a visited page can fork-bomb the machine and occupy every UDP socket, and that socket exhaustion is then chained into a working DNS cache poisoning attack that defeats a major DNS defence.
Record
- Researcher
- Matthias Gierlings, Marcus Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk
- Published by
- usenix.org
- Topic
- Browser
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This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Matthias Gierlings, Marcus Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on .