Collected research
Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86
On modern Intel and AMD x86 CPUs, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling makes clock frequency depend on the data being processed, so power side-channel leakage becomes wall-clock timing leakage observable remotely with no power interface. A chosen-ciphertext attack amplifies one key-bit guess into thousands of high or low power operations, extracting a full SIKE key.
Record
- Researcher
- Yingchen Wang, Riccardo Paccagnella, Elizabeth Tang He, Hovav Shacham, Christopher W. Fletcher and David Kohlbrenner
- Published by
- usenix.org
- Topic
- Other
In the archive
Related sources
- USENIX Security '22-Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86
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This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Yingchen Wang, Riccardo Paccagnella, Elizabeth Tang He, Hovav Shacham, Christopher W. Fletcher and David Kohlbrenner, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on .