Collected research

GET /out: Automated Discovery of Application-Layer Censorship Evasion Strategies

Michael Harrity, Kevin Bock, Frederick Sell and Dave Levin · usenix.org

Automated search for censorship evasion strategies in application-layer messages rather than TCP/IP headers, so the resulting evasions need no elevated socket privileges to deploy. Applied to HTTP and DNS censorship in China, India and Kazakhstan it found 77 HTTP and 9 DNS strategies, many of which work because censors follow the RFCs more strictly than real servers do.

Record

Researcher

Michael Harrity, Kevin Bock, Frederick Sell and Dave Levin

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Other

In the archive

• Collected in the 2022 research round

Related sources

• USENIX Security '22 - GET /out: Automated Discovery of Application-Layer Censorship Evasion...

Tags

• filter-bypass
• parser-differential
• http
• dns
• fuzzing
• measurement-study
• tooling
• owasp-a05-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Michael Harrity, Kevin Bock, Frederick Sell and Dave Levin, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.