Collected research

Fingerprinting in Style: Detecting Browser Extensions via Injected Style Sheets

Pierre Laperdrix, Oleksii Starov, Quan Chen, Alexandros Kapravelos and Nick Nikiforakis · usenix.org

Browser extensions that inject their own style sheets into every page can be identified by the site being visited. A pipeline extracts each extension's injected CSS rules and builds trigger elements whose computed style changes only when that extension is present, uniquely fingerprinting 4,446 Chrome extensions, 1,074 of them undetectable by earlier methods.

Record

Researcher

Pierre Laperdrix, Oleksii Starov, Quan Chen, Alexandros Kapravelos and Nick Nikiforakis

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Browser

In the archive

• Collected in the 2021 research round

Related sources

• USENIX Security '21 - Fingerprinting in Style: Detecting Browser Extensions via Injected Style

Tags

• browser-extension
• css
• info-leak
• dom
• static-analysis
• dynamic-analysis
• large-scale-scan
• mitigation

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Pierre Laperdrix, Oleksii Starov, Quan Chen, Alexandros Kapravelos and Nick Nikiforakis, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.