Collected research

Checking Passwords on Leaky Computers: A Side Channel Analysis of Chrome's Password Leak Detect Protocol

Andrew Kwong, Walter Wang, Jason Kim, Jonathan Berger, Daniel Genkin, Eyal Ronen, Hovav Shacham, Riad Wahby and Yuval Yarom · usenix.org

Analyses Chrome's password leak detection protocol and shows the implementation leaks through microarchitectural side channels in its scrypt hashing, hash-to-elliptic-curve step and modular inversion, letting an observer recover a user's password with a single dictionary guess and letting a malicious server learn information about it.

Record

Researcher

Andrew Kwong, Walter Wang, Jason Kim, Jonathan Berger, Daniel Genkin, Eyal Ronen, Hovav Shacham, Riad Wahby and Yuval Yarom

Published by

usenix.org

Topic

Browser

In the archive

• Collected in the 2023 research round

Related sources

• USENIX Security '23 - Checking Passwords on Leaky Computers: A Side Channel Analysis of Chrome's...

Tags

• side-channel
• timing-attack
• info-leak
• prior-art-extension

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Andrew Kwong, Walter Wang, Jason Kim, Jonathan Berger, Daniel Genkin, Eyal Ronen, Hovav Shacham, Riad Wahby and Yuval Yarom, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 19 August 2026.