Collected research

Cache Timing Attacks Revisited: Efficient and Repeatable Browser History, OS and Network Sniffing

Chetan Bansal, Sören Preibusch and Natasa Milic-Frayling · SpringerLink

Timing how fast a browser fetches a resource shows whether it was already cached, revealing where the victim has been. Driving the probes from Web Workers at roughly 300 requests a second, with timeouts so probing does not itself pollute the cache, makes the attack fast and repeatable through private browsing, HTTPS and corporate proxies.

Record

Researcher

Chetan Bansal, Sören Preibusch and Natasa Milic-Frayling

Published by

SpringerLink

Topic

Browser

In the archive

• Collected in the 2015 research round

Tags

• cache
• timing-attack
• side-channel
• xsleak
• info-leak
• https
• proxy
• measurement-study
• owasp-a02-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Chetan Bansal, Sören Preibusch and Natasa Milic-Frayling, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 9 August 2026.