Collected research
Timing-Based Browsing Privacy Vulnerabilities Via Site Isolation
Because Chromium's site isolation gives each site its own renderer process, load timing leaks cross-site state: an attacker page can learn which of a chosen set of sites are already loaded in the browser and which one the user is interacting with. On Alexa Top 3000, 95 to 99 percent of sites were vulnerable by the paper's three metrics.
Record
- Researcher
- Zihao Jin, Ziqiao Kong, Shuo Chen and Haixin Duan
- Published by
- Microsoft Research
- Topic
- Other
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This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Zihao Jin, Ziqiao Kong, Shuo Chen and Haixin Duan, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on .