Collected research

Latex Gloves: Protecting Browser Extensions from Probing and Revelation Attacks

Alexander Sjösten, Steven Van Acker, Pablo Picazo-Sanchez and Andrei Sabelfeld · ndss-symposium.org

Browser extensions give themselves away: a page can probe web-accessible resources by URL, and an extension that injects a WAR reference into the page reveals Firefox per-profile random UUID. Combining revelation with probing uniquely identifies about 90 percent of content-injecting extensions and yields a stable per-browser tracking identifier.

Record

Researcher

Alexander Sjösten, Steven Van Acker, Pablo Picazo-Sanchez and Andrei Sabelfeld

Published by

ndss-symposium.org

Format

Whitepaper

Topic

Browser

In the archive

• Collected in the 2019 research round

Related sources

• NDSS 2019 Latex Gloves: Protecting Browser Extensions from Probing and Revelation Attacks

Tags

• browser-extension
• info-leak
• dom
• javascript
• large-scale-scan
• measurement-study
• defence

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Alexander Sjösten, Steven Van Acker, Pablo Picazo-Sanchez and Andrei Sabelfeld, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 14 August 2026.