Collected research

Killed by Proxy: Analyzing Client-end TLS Interception Software

Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet and Mohammad Mannan · ndss-symposium.org

A framework for testing the TLS proxies that antivirus and parental-control products insert into a host's traffic, covering root-certificate handling, certificate validation, TLS parameters and client transparency. Of 14 products tested, several accepted forged certificates or had extractable private keys, letting a network attacker impersonate any HTTPS server.

Record

Researcher

Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet and Mohammad Mannan

Published by

ndss-symposium.org

Format

Whitepaper

Topic

HTTP

In the archive

• Collected in the 2016–17 research round

Tags

• tls
• https
• proxy
• measurement-study
• case-study
• owasp-a02-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet and Mohammad Mannan, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 14 August 2026.