Collected research

JavaScript Template Attacks: Automatically Inferring Host Information for Targeted Exploits

Michael Schwarz, Florian Lackner and Daniel Gruss · ndss-symposium.org

An automated method records every property JavaScript can read in many environments and builds templates from them, so a property stable on one system but different on another leaks the host. Two new side channels also reveal the CPU instruction set and the memory allocator, defeating anti-fingerprinting in Firefox, Chrome, Edge and mobile Tor and guiding targeted exploits.

Record

Researcher

Michael Schwarz, Florian Lackner and Daniel Gruss

Published by

ndss-symposium.org

Format

Whitepaper

Topic

Injection

In the archive

• Collected in the 2019 research round

Related sources

• NDSS 2019 JavaScript Template Attacks: Automatically Inferring Host Info for Targeted Exploits

Tags

• side-channel
• info-leak
• javascript
• dom
• dynamic-analysis

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Michael Schwarz, Florian Lackner and Daniel Gruss, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 14 August 2026.