Collected research

Exaggerating Timing Attack Results Via GET Flooding

ha.ckers.org web application security lab - Archive » Exaggerating Timing Attack Results Via GET Flooding

Prompted by a forum post from Super-Friez, RSnake proposes flooding GET requests not for bandwidth but to load the server, ideally against a URL that hits the database, so a timing attack's signal grows. A difference normally measured in microseconds becomes seconds, turning an unusable timing oracle into a practical one.

Record

Document

ha.ckers.org web application security lab - Archive » Exaggerating Timing Attack Results Via GET Flooding

Published by

ha.ckers.org

Topic

Other

In the archive

• Collected in the 2007 research round

Tags

• timing-attack
• dos
• side-channel
• http
• algorithmic-complexity
• owasp-a04-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of ha.ckers.org, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 9 August 2026.