Preliminary research
Sub:jugation — Hijacking Cloud Identities by Recycling Namespaces in Global OIDC Issuers
Sub:jugation - Hijacking Cloud Identities by Recycling Namespaces in Global OIDC Issuers
AI-collected research leads through 22 September 2026, including targeted additions between broader sweeps. Unranked, incomplete, not community-vetted, and subject to change.
CI/CD platforms mint OIDC tokens from a single global issuer, and the sub claim is built entirely from a repository namespace that GitHub, GitLab and Terraform allow anyone to re-register once deleted. Recreating the path yields a token with an identical sub, so any cloud IAM role still trusting it can be assumed. Scanning showed 14% of AWS and 24% of Azure trusted namespaces unclaimed, and GitHub Code Search finds workflows with cleartext role ARNs to target.
Record
- Document
- Sub:jugation - Hijacking Cloud Identities by Recycling Namespaces in Global OIDC Issuers
- Researcher
- Tal Skverer
- Published by
- Astrix Security
- Topic
- Server
In the archive
Related sources
- Sleeper Squats: How a Hyphen (Almost) Unraveled GitHub's Immutable OIDC Subject Claim
- Immutable subject claims for GitHub Actions OIDC tokens
Tags
This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Tal Skverer, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on .