Collected research

RebirthDay Attack: Reviving DNS Cache Poisoning with the Birthday Paradox

Xiang Li, Mingming Zhang, Zuyao Xu, Fasheng Miao, Yuqi Qiu, Baojun Liu, Jia Zhang, Xiaofeng Zheng, Haixin Duan, Zheli Liu, Yunhai Zhang and Dunqiu Fan · ACM

Studies how distinct EDNS Client Subnet values prevent DNS query aggregation while replies omitting that option create additional spoofed-response matches. Controlled resolver experiments and deployment measurements examine poisoning opportunities, configuration requirements and limits; Internet measurements identify prerequisites rather than confirmed poisoned services.

Record

Researcher

Xiang Li, Mingming Zhang, Zuyao Xu, Fasheng Miao, Yuqi Qiu, Baojun Liu, Jia Zhang, Xiaofeng Zheng, Haixin Duan, Zheli Liu, Yunhai Zhang and Dunqiu Fan

Published by

ACM

Topic

HTTP

In the archive

• Collected in the 2025 research round

Related sources

• RebirthDay Attack: Reviving DNS Cache Poisoning with the Birthday Paradox Whitepaper

Tags

• dns
• cache-poisoning
• measurement-study
• parser-differential

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Xiang Li, Mingming Zhang, Zuyao Xu, Fasheng Miao, Yuqi Qiu, Baojun Liu, Jia Zhang, Xiaofeng Zheng, Haixin Duan, Zheli Liu, Yunhai Zhang and Dunqiu Fan, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on 13 September 2026.