Preliminary research
LLM Heist: auditing LiteLLM traffic rerouting, provider-key exposure and tool-call injection
LLM Heist: Hijacking LiteLLM for Traffic Interception, Key Theft, and Tool-Call Injection
AI-collected research leads through 22 September 2026, including targeted additions between broader sweeps. Unranked, incomplete, not community-vetted, and subject to change.
Shows how an administrator credential can reroute a trusted LiteLLM gateway to an attacker proxy, causing provider credentials to be presented there. Subsequent forwarding and structured response modification enable traffic interception and tool-call injection, subject to the client’s tool permissions.
Record
- Document
- LLM Heist: Hijacking LiteLLM for Traffic Interception, Key Theft, and Tool-Call Injection
- Researcher
- Johann Rehberger
- Published by
- Embrace The Red
- Date
- Topic
- Injection
In the archive
Tags
This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Johann Rehberger, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host; this one was last captured on .