Collected research

Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform’s Cloud Build

Spencer Gietzen · Rhino Security Labs · 28 April 2020

Shows that a principal with permission to create Cloud Build jobs can run an attacker-defined build and recover the default Cloud Build service account token. The technique turns a narrowly described build permission into the service account's often broader cloud privileges.

Record

Researcher

Spencer Gietzen

Published by

Rhino Security Labs

Date

28 April 2020

In the archive

• Collected in the 2020 research round

Tags

• privilege-escalation
• cloud
• ci-cd
• abuse-of-functionality
• owasp-a01-2021
• owasp-a04-2021
• owasp-a08-2021

This page is the archive's own catalogue record. The research is the work of Spencer Gietzen, first published at the original source. Preserved copies are kept so the citation survives its host.