

Telegram anonymity fails in desktop

Telegram anonymity fails in desktop - Dhiraj Mishra, inputzero.io.

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Content

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Hi Internet,

Summary: Strangely [tdesktop 1.3.14](#) and [Telegram for windows \(3.3.0.0 WP8.1\)](#) leaks end user private and public IP address while making calls. This bug was awarded €2000 by [Telegram security team](#). (Sweett..)

|




| | | Img Src: https://telegram.org/img/tl_card_synchronize.gif | |

Telegram is supposedly a secure messaging application, but it forces clients to only use P2P connection while initiating a call, however this setting can also be changed from "Settings > Privacy and security > Calls > peer-to-peer" to other available options. The tdesktop and telegram for windows breaks this trust by leaking public/private IP address of end user and there was no such option available yet for setting "P2P > nobody" in tdesktop and telegram for windows.

PS: Even telegram for android will also leak your IP address if you have not set "Settings > Privacy and security > Calls > peer-to-peer > nobody" (But Peer-to-Peer settings for call option already exists in telegram for android).

To view this in action in tdesktop:

1. Open tdesktop,
1. Initiate a call to anyone,
1. You will notice the end user IP address is leaking.



Other scenario:**

1. Open tdesktop in Ubuntu and login with user A
1. Open telegram in windows phone login with user B
2. Let user B initiate the call to user A
3. While user A access log will have public/private IP address of user B.

```
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.16.3
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.16.4
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.12.1
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.12.5
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.8.3
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.8.5
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 180.1.1.1
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 0.0.0.0
D/tgvoip: Current RTT via 91.108.16.3: 0.135, average: 0.135
D/tgvoip: Current RTT via 91.108.8.5: 0.239, average: 0.239
D/tgvoip: Current RTT via 91.108.8.3: 0.244, average: 0.246
D/tgvoip: Current RTT via 91.108.16.4: 0.340, average: 0.333
D/tgvoip: Current RTT via 91.108.12.5: 0.445, average: 0.452
D/tgvoip: Current RTT via 91.108.12.1: 0.446, average: 0.453
W/tgvoip: Received a packet from unknown source 192.168.1.106:16425
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.16.3
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.16.4
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.12.1
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.12.5
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.8.3
V/tgvoip: Sending ping to 91.108.8.5
```

Not only the [MTPProto Mobile Protocol](#) fails here in covering the IP address, rather such information can also be used for OSINT. This issue was fixed in [1.3.17 beta](#) and [v1.4.0](#) which have an option of setting your "P2P to Nobody/My contacts", Later [CVE-2018-17780](#) was assign to this vulnerability.

Peer-to-Peer

- ☐ Everybody
- ☒ My contacts
- ☐ Nobody

Disabling peer-to-peer will relay all calls through Telegram servers to avoid revealing your IP address, but may slightly decrease audio quality.

CANCEL SAVE

Regards

Dhiraj

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