

Full Disclosure: ...because you can't get enough of clickjacking

Full Disclosure: ...because you can't get enough of clickjacking - Michal Zalewski, seclists.org.

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Content

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...because you can't get enough of clickjacking

From: Michal Zalewski <[lcamtuf \(\) coredump cx](mailto:lcamtuf@coredump.cx)> *Date:* Fri, 12 Mar 2010 22:28:01 -0800

[I promise to post something more interesting shortly - but in the meantime, I wanted to drop a quick note about something kinda amusing.
]

There was a considerable amount of buzz around clickjacking [1] in the past year or so. It is commonly believed that [this](#) simple attack can only be realistically employed to exploit one-click UI actions. Alas, a related vector is generally overlooked: JS focus semantics - a source of considerable amount of grief in the past [2] - can be abused to execute multi-step attacks by altering focus between a hidden frame and the edited document [while](#) the user is simply typing something in. No need [for](#) pixel-accurate positioning of the target, too.

Consider [this](#) whimsical proof-of-concept exploit (works on Windows, WebKit-based browsers only):

<http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/focus-webkit/>

It's not very serious, but more cuter than clickjacking proper. WebKit focus behavior on Windows makes [this](#) particular PoC easier there, but I believe that no browser is designed to counter [this](#) general attack pattern in any particular way. The usual opt-in mitigations (X-Frame-Options, frame busting) should offer a reasonable degree of protection already.

[1] [http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part2#Arbitrary_page_mashups_%28UI_redressing%29](http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part2#Arbitrary_page_mashups_%28UI_redressing%29)

[2] <http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/focusbug/> and so forth

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- **...because you can't get enough of clickjacking** *Michal Zalewski (Mar 12)*

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