

Pure Java™, Pure Evil™ Popups

Pure Java™, Pure Evil™ Popups - ma1, hackademix.net.

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Content

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Imagine you're a web advertiser. Imagine you can open a popup window from a web page defeating any popup blocker. Imagine this popup can invade the whole desktop, **full screen**. Imagine this popup has no title bar, no menus, no toolbar, no location bar, no border and no buttons. **No mean to close it**. Imagine user can't move or minimize this popup. It will go away only when the browser is killed or your show is done...

Now imagine you're a [phisher](#). Imagine you can use this almighty popup to draw anything you want. A fake browser or — why not? — a whole **fake desktop** to collect user's data.

Impossible wet dreams of clueless evildoers? No, it's just [100% Pure Java™ Reality](#).

If you're using **Opera** or a **Gecko**-based browser, a similar full screen evil can be performed with just [a few JavaScript lines](#). No need to compile and host any applet, thanks to the [LiveConnect](#) technology.

I've notified [Sun](#) on 29-Jul-2007. My bug report has been evaluated and publicly disclosed **by Sun** yesterday (06-Aug-2007) as a [request for enhancement](#).

Update (08-Aug-2007):

Looks like responsibly filing a bug in the Sun's bug tracker, religiously waiting one week for its classification by Sun engineers and having it finally **published by Sun itself** as a non-security-related RFE is not enough to go public. I should have known that security reports should be submitted to *security-alert at sun dot com* to be properly handled. When Maarten Van Horenbeeck (SANS ISC) did it, Sun requested *him* to request me *"to keep the issue confidential, and hold the blog post, till Sun has completely fixed it and is ready to issue a Sun Alert to warn users"*. At that time, my post had been already out for some hours, read and commented by many "hackers" supporting full disclosure. Therefore, I respectfully answered (directly to *security-alert at sun dot com*, with SANS in CC) explaining why retracting it would have been useless, but apologized for my mishandled report and offered any other help, including my promise to use *security-alert at sun dot*

com instead of the regular bug tracker for future responsible disclosures. I received no answer yet, but in the meanwhile my [bug report](#) has been reclassified and made inaccessible. I still wonder why should I have known better than a Sun Bug Tracker employee what the proper channel for a security report was...

Will this take more or less than [ten days](#) to be fixed?

In the meanwhile, [NoScript](#) is your friend ;)

Update (Oct-22-2007)

[Issue fixed](#). Thanks, Sun.

Demos

- [Applet based, works in any browser](#) — (**update:** source code [here](#))
- [JavaScript based, works in Opera and Gecko-based browsers](#)

Credits

Many thanks to:

- Ronald van den Heetkamp for [early inspiration](#)
- Dan Veditz (Mozilla)
- timeless

[\[image: image\]](#)

By ma1

Hacker, atheist, humanist, dad, mozillian, security breaker and builder, creator of NoScript, casting spells at the Tor Browser. He/him.

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