--- type: Whitepaper title: "All Your Screens Are Belong to Us: Attacks Exploiting the HTML5 Screen Sharing API" description: "The HTML5 screen sharing extension to getUserMedia creates a cross-origin feedback loop: a site the user shares their screen with sees everything rendered, whatever its origin. An attacker opens authenticated cross-origin pages in the victim's browser and reads CSRF tokens, browsing history and private data, hiding the theft within the limits of human vision." resource: "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2014/papers/AllYourScreensareBelongtoUs_c_AttacksExploitingtheHTML5ScreenSharingAPI.pdf" tags: [whitepaper, webseclist-reference, sop-bypass, csrf, webrtc, info-leak, side-channel, same-origin-policy, iframe, javascript, owasp-a01-2021] generated: by: webseclist-refs/1 at: "2026-08-14T21:00:33+00:00" status: stable stale_after: 2027-08-14 sources: - id: original resource: "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2014/papers/AllYourScreensareBelongtoUs_c_AttacksExploitingtheHTML5ScreenSharingAPI.pdf" title: "All Your Screens Are Belong to Us: Attacks Exploiting the HTML5 Screen Sharing API" author: Yuan Tian, Ying-Chuan Liu, Amar Bhosale, Lin-Shung Huang, Patrick Tague, Collin Jackson also_at: [] authors: - Yuan Tian - Ying-Chuan Liu - Amar Bhosale - Lin-Shung Huang - Patrick Tague - Collin Jackson canonical_url: "" cited_by: - "2014.md:67" commit: "" content_sha256: 984bbe80198ffe506d4b056ada575e7970f6dda4a596a2d2bcc54786ad4c4552 depth: full depth_reason: default kind: whitepaper language: "" licence: unknown original_url: "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2014/papers/AllYourScreensareBelongtoUs_c_AttacksExploitingtheHTML5ScreenSharingAPI.pdf" published: "" publisher: "" publisher_english: "" raw_sha256: 25a34b630c9739fa34f0daf4b5339710ec6c01652d7147ab5965721297ab27b2 retrieved_from: "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2014/papers/AllYourScreensareBelongtoUs_c_AttacksExploitingtheHTML5ScreenSharingAPI.pdf" retrieved_kind: stored retrieved_utc: "2026-08-14T21:00:33+00:00" slug: all-your-screens-belong-us-attacks-exploiting-html5-screen-sharing-api snapshot: "" title_english: "" translation_file: "" translation_of: "" --- # All Your Screens Are Belong to Us: Attacks Exploiting the HTML5 Screen Sharing API **All Your Screens Are Belong to Us: Attacks Exploiting the HTML5 Screen Sharing API** - Yuan Tian, Ying-Chuan Liu, Amar Bhosale, Lin-Shung Huang, Patrick Tague, Collin Jackson, Publisher not stated. - Published: date not stated - Original: - Preserved from: https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2014/papers/AllYourScreensareBelongtoUs_c_AttacksExploitingtheHTML5ScreenSharingAPI.pdf (stored) on 2026-08-14 - Licence: unknown Rights remain with the original author and publisher. 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All Your Screens are Belong to Us: Attacks Exploiting the HTML5 Screen Sharing API Yuan Tian∗ , Ying-Chuan Liu‡ , Amar Bhosale† , Lin-Shung Huang∗ ,Patrick Tague† ,Collin Jackson∗ Carnegie Mellon University ∗ {yuan.tian, linshung.huang, collin.jackson}@sv.cmu.edu,† {amarb, tague}@cmu.edu,‡ {kateycliu}@gmail.com Abstract—HTML5 changes many aspects in the browser world origin feedback loop does not exist by default; in most cases, by introducing numerous new concepts; in particular, the new what is shown to the user is only accessible to that user and HTML5 screen sharing API impacts the security implications of the same-origin site. With the loop, however, an attacker can browsers tremendously. One of the core assumptions on which exploit this information and launch attacks against the user browser security is built is that there is no cross-origin feedback sharing the screen. The integrity and confidentiality of the loop from the client to the server. However, the screen sharing user’s information are severely threatened. API allows creating a cross-origin feedback loop. Consequently, websites will potentially be able to see all visible content from The attacker who has access to the victim’s screen is very the user’s screen, irrespective of its origin. This cross-origin analogous to a shoulder-surfer [5] but with the additional power feedback loop, when combined with human vision limitations, can introduce new vulnerabilities. An attacker can capture sensitive of opening and viewing the web pages of the attacker’s choice information from victim’s screen using the new API without the inside the user’s browser without the user’s consent. Since consensus of the victim. We investigate the security implications of the browser automatically sends authentication information the screen sharing API and discuss how existing defenses against (e.g. HTTP cookies), the newly opened pages that are only traditional web attacks fail during screen sharing. We show that supposed to be seen by an authenticated user can now be seen several attacks are possible with the help of the screen sharing by the attacker. We show that the attacker can steal sensitive API: cross-site request forgery, history sniffing, and information information such as personal messages and bank statements stealing. We discuss how popular websites such as Amazon and from the attacker-opened pages. Even worse, we show that Wells Fargo can be attacked using this API and demonstrate the cross-site request forgery (CSRF) tokens can be stolen from consequences of the attacks such as economic losses, compromised the page source, which can then be used to mount further account and information disclosure. The objective of this paper is to present the attacks using the screen sharing API, analyze attacks against the user. the fundamental cause and motivate potential defenses to design In this paper, we discuss the extensions to the getUserMe- a more secure screen sharing API. dia() API introduced by Google to enable screen sharing and their potential impact on user security. We present multiple I. I NTRODUCTION attacks using this API that can compromise a user’s confiden- Web browsers have evolved from applications that render tiality and integrity. We show how an attacker can steal a user’s simple web pages to application platforms that handle complex data from the screen to modify the user’s accounts on popular media, which often require installation of plugins, such as websites. Since the attackers have the ability to see the entire the Google voice and video chat plugins [1]. Recently, the content of the user’s screen, the attack can not be restricted by Web Real-Time Communications (RTC) Working Group [2] the same-origin policy. Because of the limitations of human proposed APIs that allow real time communication between sensing, a clever attacker can steal cross-origin page content by browsers using only HTML5 APIs via JavaScript. Audio and forcefully opening cross-origin pages on the victim’s browser video communication, including screen sharing, can be set up or embedding cross-origin content inside an iframe. Making using this RTC platform [3]. The Google Chrome browser the attacks unobservable such as flashing content quickly or supports screen sharing as an experimental feature. It is also using translucent color, the attacker can eavesdrop cross-origin available in Mozilla Firefox’s nightly build. Moreover, this API information without drawing attention. We also discuss how is interoperable between Google Chrome and Firefox Nightly the attacker can steal browser resources such as autocomplete with a slight modification to the calling site [4]. and autofill history [6] since these resources are shared across origins for the user’s convenience. These attacks can lead to The screen sharing API could be utilized to build interactive serious consequences such as loss of money from bank accounts, media tools and applications, however, the possibility of sharing personal information disclosure and identity theft. Simply put, the screen with other web browsers and servers raises various the attacker can not only see what the user wants him to see security and privacy concerns. Specifically, the screen sharing but also force to user to show other sensitive information. API creates a cross-origin feedback loop that continuously transmits the screen back to the screen sharing website which With the knowledge of the fundamental causes of these belongs to other domains. This loop allows other users and the attacks, we analyze the possibility of preventing them by a fine- screen sharing website to see the user’s confidential information. grained screen sharing, use of incognito mode, and blocking The fundamental assumption for the web is that this cross- third-party cookies. We compare these solutions with a focus on security and usability. Since the paper is primarily concerned • Techniques that Clone the Document Object Model about attacks using the screen sharing API, we leave the (DOM) to Simulate Screen Sharing: Another option implementation and evaluation of these defenses as promising to share a user’s tab is transmitting an HTML DOM future work. object to other sites. In [9], the author describes two methods to do so: using Mutation Observers to monitor Summary of Contributions the changes of DOM objects, and mirroring the entire • We have analyzed the possible impact of the screen HTML DOM. sharing API on user privacy and security. Based on our • New HTML5 Screen Sharing API: The extension experiments and understanding about the current design of the getUserMedia() API built on WebRTC allows a of the screen sharing API, we present the security user’s screen to be shared via JavaScript as illustrated implications and vulnerabilities that this API could in Figure 1. The detailed usage of the getUserMedia() possibly introduce. API is introduced in [10]1 . We use Chrome 26 imple- • Based on the vulnerabilities that we have discovered, mentation as an example to explain the screen sharing we show how malicious screen sharing websites can API here. Figure 2 shows the initiation of a screen steal cross-origin content from the user’s browser, sharing session. There are two things to note. One is thus affecting privacy, confidentiality and integrity. We that the API can work only over SSL connections. The demonstrate how an attacker can perform a CSRF other is that the browser asks for the user’s permission attack even if the target website has employed CSRF before it starts capturing the screen. After the user defenses, and how the attacker can steal other sensitive grants the permission to share the screen, the API will user information. We also discuss how these attacks capture the entire visible area of the screen including can be made imperceptible to human by exploiting the the area outside the browser. Also, the browser flashes limitations of human sensing. a red notification on the tab icon to alert the user that his screen is currently being shared in this tab, as • We raised an alarm to the browser vendors about illustrated in Figure 3. the perils of view-source links. In particular, we highlighted the risk of malicious screen sharing websites gaining unauthorized access to security var share = function share () { credentials by viewing the source of cross-origin var constraints = { websites. As a result of our security report, Google video: { [7] patched the Chrome browser, which prevents mandatory: { view-source links to be opened inside iframes. chromeMediaSource: 'screen' } } Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. }; In Section II, we discuss various screen sharing techniques navigator.getUserMedia = along with their security implications. We present the threat navigator.webkitGetUserMedia || model in Section III, and demonstrate attacks using the screen navigator.getUserMedia; sharing API in Section IV. In Section V, we analyze the navigator.getUserMedia(constraints, deficiencies of existing defenses and propose possible defenses onSharingSuccess, onSharingError); to mitigate the attacks using the screen sharing API. We }; discuss related work in Section VI and conclude in Section VII. Fig. 1. The usage of the screen sharing API: Google Chrome exposes the chromeMediaSource constraint for developers to specify the video source. The II. S CREEN S HARING T ECHNIQUES constraint is used as an argument of getUserMedia(). If the media source is set as ’screen’, getUserMedia() would capture the entire screen into the media Various solutions have been developed to achieve screen stream. sharing functionality in browsers. We classify these solutions into three categories: Security Implications. Due to the fundamental differences among screen sharing implementations, the new HTML5 API • Techniques that Require Installation of Plugins or has a very different security implication from the traditional Extensions: Popular products such as Google+ allow screen sharing techniques. In comparison to the screen sharing their users to share their screens with others after techniques that require the user to download a plugin or an installing the Google voice and video chat plugin extension, the site that uses the screen sharing HTML5 API [1]. Additionally, the screen can be shared using the runs inside the browser and has the ability to control its own Chrome extension API and WebSockets [8]. The API page as well as open cross-origin content inside an iframe continuously captures the screenshots as images and or a new window. Although the browser’s same-origin policy transmits the images to other sites via WebSocket. The prevents the malicious site from accessing cross-origin content Chrome extension API chrome.desktopCapture is only accessible to whitelisted extensions with whitelisted 1 In Chrome 26, the user needs to enable screen capture support by setting origins. “Enable screen capture support in getUserMedia()” in chrome://flags. &YYFHPJWឪX8HWJJS8MFWNSL the attacker can retrieve the URL from the source code. For example, in Figure 8 the source code of the “Transfer” page For Firefox, the code has slight changes: reveals the URL of “Send & Receive Money” which is supposed to be secured by the session argument. Since the Transfer page